Abstract. We study multiprocessor scheduling games with setup times on identical machines. Given a set of scheduling policies (coordination mechanism) on the machines, each out of n players chooses a machine to assign his owned job to, so as to minimize his individual completion time. Each job has a processing length and is of a certain type. Same-type jobs incur a setup overhead to the machine they are assigned to. We study the Price of Anarchy with respect to the makespan of stable assignments, that are pure Nash or strong equilibria for the underlying strategic game. We study in detail the performance of a well established preemptive scheduling mechanism. In an effort to improve over its performance, we introduce a class of mechanisms with certain properties, for which we examine existence of pure Nash and strong equilibria. We identify their performance limitations, and analyze an optimum mechanism out of this class. Finally, we point out several interesting open problems.
Introduction
We study multiprocessor job scheduling games with setup times, where each out of n players assigns his owned job for execution to one out of m machines. Jobs are of certain types. On any machine, jobs of a given type may be executed only after a type-dependent preprocessing (performed once for all same-type jobs) called setup. Each machine schedules its assigned jobs according to a scheduling policy (algorithm). Given the deployed scheduling policies, players assign their jobs selfishly, to minimize their individual completion times. We examine the impact of selfish behavior on the overall (social) cost of stable assignments and how this can be alleviated, by deployment of appropriate scheduling policies on the machines. Stable assignments are pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of an underlying strategic game, or strong equilibria (SE); the latter extend PNE by being resilient to coalitional deviations [1] . The overall cost of stable assignments is measured by the latest completion time among all players, known as makespan. System performance degradation due to selfish behavior is measured by the Price of Anarchy, the worst-case ratio of the makespan of the most expensive equilibrium, relative to the optimum achievable makespan [2] .
Our work is motivated by concerns in performance optimization of largescale distributed systems (computational grids, P2P file sharing systems etc.). In these systems autonomous entities (end-users, communities, enterprises) compete strategically for resources (distributed storage, processing power, bandwidth) to increase their individual profit. Setup overheads in these systems may well dominate the net processing load of tasks assigned by users; consider e.g. loading application environments, booting operating systems, establishing QoS for network connections. Scheduling with setup times also provides for modeling another very natural situation; the case where many autonomous users may benefit from the output of an identical process. In this case users may only care for the output of the setup (which takes non-negligible time) but their jobs may have virtually zero load for the machine. As an example, consider the setup corresponding to computation and writing of output to a remote file which users simply read. Then the machine may also have to deal obliviously of users' presence; only one of them may actually declare his presence by requesting execution of the setup, whereas the rest simply benefit from the request.
The vast number of resources and users in modern distributed environments renders centralized deployment of global resource management policies expensive and inefficient; a central authority may only specify local operational rules per resource, to coordinate users towards globally efficient system utilization. The deployment of such local rules was formalized in [3] , under the notion of coordination mechanisms and demonstrated for scheduling and network congestion games. In scheduling, local policies are scheduling algorithms deployed on the machines; their set is referred to as a coordination mechanism. The policies may be preemptive or non-preemptive, deterministic or randomized; a policy decides the order of execution of assigned jobs on each machine and may also introduce delays in a systematic manner. A coordination mechanism induces a strategic game, by affecting the players' completion times. The purpose of designing coordination mechanisms is to induce a strategic game that has stable assignments (in our case, PNE or SE outcomes) with low P oA, that can be found efficiently.
A series of works concerned the study of strategic games induced by well established and novel scheduling policies applied on basic scheduling settings [2, 4, 3, [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . The P oA of strong equilibria (SPoA) was first studied for selfish scheduling games in [11] under the preemptive mechanism introduced in [2] . We give a brief account of these works below, in section 2. Our focus is on strongly local scheduling policies under which, the completion time of a job j on a machine i is solely dependent on the parameters (with respect to i) of jobs assigned to i. It is called simply local if the completion time of j depends on parameters of jobs assigned to i across all machines. We investigate in detail the performance of strongly local mechanisms that can handle the challenges outlined above. Contribution We analyze the performance of deterministic strongly local coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling with setup times, on identical machines. We give a detailed analysis of a preemptive scheduling mechanism, referred to as Makespan (section 4), which was introduced in [2] and studied subsequently in [7, 11, 12] . We show existence of SE for the game induced by Makespan. If k denotes the number of different types of jobs, the P oA of Makespan is m, when m ≤ k and k + 1 − ǫ, for 1 > ǫ ≥ 1/m when m > k. We prove SP oA = 3/2 for m = 2 and 2 for m ≥ 3. In section 5 we study a class of deterministic strongly local mechanisms, referred to as type ordering mechanisms, that can schedule jobs obliviously of the number of players with zero processing lengths. We prove that any deterministic type ordering mechanism induces a strategic game that has PNE, for any number of machines, and SE for 2 machines. We prove a lower bound of m+1 2 for the P oA of type ordering mechanisms, and argue that other intuitive solutions are no more powerful. In section 6 we analyze the performance of an optimal type ordering mechanism. It achieves a PoA of 
Related Work
Performance of coordination mechanisms with respect to Nash equilibria in multi-processor scheduling games has been the subject of several recent works [2, 4, 3, 7, 6, 5, 11, 12, 8, 9] . The preemptive mechanism known as Makespan was introduced and studied in [2] in the scheduling setting of uniformly related machines; each machine i has speed v i and each job j has processing length ℓ j , so that the time needed by i to execute j is ℓ j /v i . The Makespan mechanism schedules jobs in parallel on each machine, so that they all have the same completion time.
Makespan was shown to have P oA = Θ( log m log log m ) on uniformly related machines in [4, 5] (see also [13] ). In case of identical machines, all speeds are equal and the P oA of PNE is known to be 2m m+1 by the works of [14, 15] . This holds also for the (S)P oA of strong equilibria, which were shown to exist in any machine model [11] . [12] studied the SP oA as a function of the number of different speeds.
Scheduling games in unrelated machines were additionally studied in [7] [8] [9] . In the unrelated machines model a job's processing time depends solely on the machine it is assigned to. In [7] , bounds on the P oA of well known deterministic and randomized scheduling policies were studied for unrelated machines. A wide class of non-preemptive strongly local scheduling policies was shown in [8] to have P oA ≥ m 2 . This class contains well known policies such as "longest" and "shortest job first". The authors designed a simply local mechanism that induces PNE with P oA = O(log 2 m). A local mechanism with PNE having P oA = O(log m) was given recently in [9] . Deterministic and randomized non-clairvoyant mechanisms for scheduling on unrelated machines were studied in [10] .
Preemptive multi-processor scheduling with setup times [16] (see also [17] [SS6]) requires a minimum makespan preemptive schedule, such that the setup is executed by a machine between execution of two job portions of different type. The best known approximation algorithm has a performance guarantee of 4 3 [18] (see [19] for a previous 3 2 factor). For equal setup times a PTAS is given in [18] and an FPTAS for 2 machines in [20] . See [21] for a slightly different version.
We consider m identical machines, indexed by i ∈ M = {1, . . . , m} and n jobs j ∈ J = {1, . . . n}, each owned by a self-interested player. We use interchangeably the terms job and player. Every job j has a type t j ∈ U, where U is the universe of all possible types 3 . The subset of U corresponding to the set of jobs J is denoted by T = {t j |j ∈ J } and define k = |T |. We refer to any specific type by θ. Each job j ∈ J and each type θ ∈ U are respectively associated to processing length ℓ j ≥ 0 and setup time w(θ) ≥ 0. If w(θ) = 0, then ℓ j > 0 for all j with t j = θ. Otherwise, we allow ℓ j = 0. Agent j ∈ J chooses a strategy s j ∈ M (a machine to assign his job to). A strategy profile (assignment) is denoted by s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ); s −j refers to s, without the strategy of j.
The cost of a player j under assignment s is c j (s), the completion time of his job. c j (s) depends on the scheduling policy deployed on machine s j . The completion time of machine i ∈ M under s is C i (s) = max j:sj =i c j (s). The social cost function is the makespan C(s) = max i C i (s) = max j c j (s). We use L i (s) = j:sj =i ℓ j for the total job processing load on machine i under assignment s, excluding setup times. L i,θ (s) = tj =θ,sj =i ℓ j is the total processing length of type θ assigned on machine i. T i (s) denotes the subset of types that have jobs on machine i under s. A scheduling policy is a scheduling algorithm. The set of scheduling policies deployed on all machines is a coordination mechanism.
Definition 1. [1, 11]
A strategy profile s is a strong equilibrium if for every subset of players J ⊆ J and every assignment s
The makespan of a socially optimum assignment s * can be lower bounded as:
The only restriction that we impose on the scheduling policies is that the setup of any type θ on any machine i is executed before execution of type θ jobs on i.
On the Makespan Mechanism
We study an adaptation of the preemptive mechanism introduced in [2] and referred to as Makespan [7, 10] . In any assignment s under Makespan it is c j (s) = C sj (s) for every j ∈ J ; completion time of j equals completion time of the machine that j is assigned to. Makespan schedules jobs on a machine in parallel by usage of time multiplexing. They are broken into small pieces that are executed in a round-robin fashion; each job is assigned a fraction of the machine's time proportionally to its processing length. See full version for the proof; it generalizes a related proof of theorem 3.1 in [11] . Thus, theorem 1 is valid even for uniformly related or unrelated machines. The most expensive PNE s has makespan C(s) ≤ θ w(θ)+ j ℓ j (all jobs on one machine). By (1a), it is P oA ≤ m. For the lower bound take k = m types of jobs, each type θ having w(θ) = 1 and containing m jobs of zero processing length. A job of each type is assigned to each machine in s. Then C(s) = m and s is clearly a PNE. In the social optimum s * each type is assigned to a dedicated machine, thus C(s * ) = 1.
Case m > k: Assume that for the most expensive PNE s it is C(s) = C 1 (s). Let x be a job of type t x = θ executed on machine 1. x cannot decrease its cost c x (s) = C 1 (s) by switching to any machine i = 1. Then
We sum up the inequalities over all machines, assuming that θ does not appear on α machines, and add C 1 (s) to both sides to obtain
Divide by m and rewrite it as: 2 for m = 2 machines. Proof. We give the proof for the case m ≥ 3 (the proof for m = 2 is deferred to the full version). Let s be a SE, s * the socially optimum assignment, and 
Type Ordering Mechanisms
We describe a class of (deterministic) type ordering mechanisms, for batch scheduling of same-type jobs. Each machine i groups jobs of the same type θ, into a batch of type θ. A type batch is executed as a whole; the setup is executed first, followed by preemptive execution of all jobs in the batch, in a Makespan fashion. Jobs within the same batch have equal completion times and are scheduled preemptively in parallel. Type batches are executed serially by each machine. Policies in type ordering mechanisms satisfy a version of the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) [8] . Under the IIA property, for any set of jobs J i ⊆ J assigned to machine i ∈ M and for any pair of types θ, θ ′ ∈ U with jobs in J i if the θ-type batch has smaller completion time than the θ ′ -type batch, then the θ batch has a smaller completion time than the θ ′ batch in any set J i ∪ {j}, j ∈ J \ J i . Presence of j does not affect the relative order of execution of θ and θ ′ batches. The IIA property was used in [8] for proving a lower bound on the P oA of a class of job ordering mechanisms in the context of unrelated machines scheduling. Type ordering policies do not introduce delays in the execution of batches, but only decide the relative order of their execution, based on a batch's type index and setup time. They do not use the number of jobs within each batch; otherwise the IIA property may not be satisfied. Job lengths are used only for Makespan-wise scheduling within batches. Hence type ordering mechanisms function obliviously of "hidden" players with zero job lengths.
We prove next existence of PNE for any number of machines, and of SE for m = 2 under type ordering mechanisms. An algorithm for finding PNE follows. Let o(i) be the ordering of types on machine i, and O = {o(i)|i ∈ M} be the set of all orderings of the mechanism. By ≺ o denote the precedence relation of types, prescribed by o ∈ O. Let M o be the set of machines that schedule according to o ∈ O. Initialize o ∈ O arbitrarily, and repeat until all jobs are assigned:
1. Find the earliest type θ according to ≺ o , with at least one unassigned job. 2. Let j be the largest length unassigned job with t j = θ. Proof. The algorithm terminates in polynomial time; once a job is assigned, it is never considered again and within every O(m + n) iterations some job is always assigned. For any type θ, denote byŝ θ the partial assignment up to the time after the last job of type θ has been assigned. We show by contradiction that no job j has incentive to deviate under an assignment s returned by the algorithm.
Assume that j does have incentive to deviate from s j , and let s ′ be the resulting assignment after deviation of j. At the time corresponding to the partial assignmentŝ tj , there is no type θ = t j and machine i such that θ ∈ T i (ŝ tj ) and t j ≺ o(i) θ. If it was the case, the first job of type θ = t j assigned to i would have been chosen before jobs of type t j were exhausted, which contradicts step 1. of the algorithm. Thus, batches of type t j are scheduled -underŝ tj -last on all machines with t j ∈ T i (ŝ tj ). Furthermore, if j wishes to deviate to a
. Let j ′ be the last job of type t j assigned to machine s j (it may be j
By the time j ′ was assigned, the completion time of i was at most C i (ŝ tj ). This contradicts step 3. of the algorithm with respect to j ′ .
⊓ ⊔
Note that the previous result can be easily extended to hold in the case of uniformly related machines (to appear in the full version -see also [13] ).
Theorem 5. For the scheduling game with setup times under type ordering mechanisms, any pure Nash equilibrium is strong, when m = 2.
Proof. Assume that s is PNE, but not SE, and let J ⊆ J be a coalition of jobs that have incentive to deviate jointly. Define J 1 = {j ∈ J|s j = 1}, J 2 = {j ∈ J|s j = 2}; since s is PNE, J 1 , J 2 = ∅. Let θ i be the earliest type according to ≺ o(i) with jobs in J i and denote by J ′ i type θ i jobs in J i . Take two jobs j 1 ∈ J ′ 1 , j 2 ∈ J ′ 2 , and let s ′ be the resulting assignment after deviation.
Since s is a PNE, it must be θ 1 ≺ o(1) θ 2 and θ 2 ≺ o(2) θ 1 because, if e.g. θ 2 ≺ o(1) θ 1 , j 2 would have incentive to deviate unilaterally to machine 1, since it wishes to deviate jointly with coalition J. Hence c j2 (
. Summing up these two inequalities, we obtain c j2 (
CASE 2: θ 1 = θ 2 . Then, in the worst case we obtain c j2 ( for every deterministic type ordering mechanism.
Proof. For any deterministic type ordering mechanism, assume there is a subset T ⊆ U of k = 2m − 1 types, say T = {1, · · · , 2m − 1}, such that: all types of T are scheduled in order of ascending index in a machines and in order of descending index in d = m − a machines. Then, there is a family of instances with P oA ≥ m+1 2 . Next we prove existence of T . Set w(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ U. When a = m or d = m, take an instance of m zero length jobs for each type θ ∈ {1, · · · , m}. Placing one job of each type on every machine yields a PNE with makespan m. An assignment of makespan 1 has all same-type jobs assigned to a dedicated machine, thus P oA ≥ m. When a ≥ 1 and d ≥ 1, the instance has:
-a jobs of zero length for each type θ ∈ {1, · · · , m − 1} -d jobs of zero length for each type θ ∈ {m + 1, · · · , 2m − 1} -m − 1 jobs of of zero length and type m -one job of length 1 and type m -no jobs for θ ∈ U \ T Assign one job of type θ ∈ {1, · · · , m − 1} on each of the a ascending type index machines, and one job of type θ ∈ {m+1, · · · , 2m−1} on each of the d descending type index machines. Put one job of type m on every machine. This is a PNE of makespan m + 1. Placing all jobs of type θ ∈ {i, 2m − i} on machine i yields makespan 2. Thus it is P oA ≥ m+1 2 . We show existence of T for sufficiently large universe U. We use the fact that any sequence of n different real numbers has a monotone (not necessarily contiguous) subsequence of √ n terms (a corollary of Theorem 4.4, page 39 in [22] ). By renaming types in U we can assume w.l.o.g. that U is ordered monotonically (index-wise) on machine 1, and set T 1 = U. Then, there is T 2 ⊆ T 1 such that |T 2 | ≥ |T 1 | and all the types of T 2 are ordered monotonically according to index, on machines 1 and 2. After m − 1 applications of the corollary, we obtain a set T m ⊆ T m−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ T 1 = U with |T m | ≥ |U| 2 1−m and all its types are scheduled monotonically to their index on every machine. We set T = T m , and take a universe U of types with |U| = (2m − 1) ⊓ ⊔ Let us note that "longest" or "shortest batch first" policies are no more powerful than type ordering mechanisms; they reduce to them for zero length jobs.
An Optimal Type Ordering Mechanism
We analyze the P oA of a type ordering mechanism termed AD (for AscendingDescending), that schedules type batches by ascending type index on half of the machines, and by descending type index on the rest. If m is odd one of the policies is applied to one machine more. First we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let T ′ ⊆ T include types with non-zero setup times. If two jobs of the same type in T ′ play an ascending and a descending index machine respectively under the AD mechanism, their type batches are scheduled last on the respective machines.
Proof. We show the result by contradiction. Let jobs x 1 , x 2 with t x1 = t x2 = θ be assigned on the ascending and descending machines 1, 2 respectively. Assume that a job y, t y = θ ′ = θ, is scheduled on 1 after type θ. Because s is a PNE, job x 2 does not decrease its completion time if it moves to machine 1; because y is scheduled after x 1 on 1:
If y switches to machine M 2 then it will be scheduled before type θ, thus its completion time will be at most c x2 (s) − w(θ) − ℓ x2 + w(θ ′ ) + ℓ y if θ ′ ∈ T 2 (s) (and at most c x2 (s) − w(θ) − ℓ x2 + ℓ y otherwise). In the worst case, we obtain:
By (2) and (3),
The next result identifies upper bounds on the P oA of AD. A proposition that follows proves tightness, through lower bounds on the Price of Stability, the ratio of the least expensive PNE makespan over the optimum makespan. We take k ≥ 2; AD is identical to Makespan for k = 1. machines respectively. We study 2 cases depending on whether θ 1 exists and whether it coincides with θ 0 or not. CASE 1: θ 0 = θ 1 or θ 1 does not exist. Job x will not decrease its completion time by moving to machine p for p = 2, . . . , m. If M θ0 (s) are the indices of machines which contain type θ 0 , then:
To obtain the upper bound we sum up (4) for p ∈ {2, . . . , m}, add C 1 (s) in the left and right hand part, and take θ ∈T ′ w(θ) = 0. We will do this analysis below, collectively for cases 1 and 2.
CASE 2: θ 0 = θ 1 and θ 1 exists. Assume θ 0 < θ 1 and let R contain the indices of ascending machines which have at least one job of type θ 1 assigned (if θ 0 > θ 1 , we consider the indices of descending machines). Let R be the indices of these machines and R ′ ⊆ R be the indices of machines that are also assigned type
If job x moves to a machine with index in p ∈ R ′ , the completion time of x becomes at most C p (s) − w(θ 1 ) + ℓ x and
Since s is a PNE:
We will sum up inequalities (4) or (5) for p ∈ {2, . . . , m} depending on whether p ∈ R or not. As in case 1 we add C 1 (s) to left and right hand parts and consider θ / ∈T ′ w(θ) = 0. Before summing note that when m is even, each type in T descending machines. We ignore one of them -different than M 1 -in the summation (we assume m ≥ 3; otherwise m = 1 and C(s) = C(s * )). Then, in case 2, type θ 1 appears at most r 2 times, r = m − 1, in the remaining m − 1 machines.
When k ≥ m we use (1a,b) with (7) to obtain C 1 (s) ≤ m+1 2 OP T . When k < m we rewrite (6) as:
Using (1b,c), we get kC(s * ) ≥ θ∈T w(θ)+ℓ x and replacing r = m and r = m−1 for even and odd m respectively, yields the stated bounds with respect to k. ⊓ ⊔ Proof. For k > m we use the same example as in the proof of theorem 6, but replace the zero length jobs with very small ǫ > 0 length. For AD the described assignment for a, d ≥ 1 applies, and it is a PNE with makespan m + 1 + (m − 1)ǫ; the socially optimum makespan has length 2 + mǫ. In any PNE, all jobs of types 1 and 2m − 1 will play exactly the strategies specified in the described PNE assignment, because a lower completion time is not achievable for them in any assignment. Inductively, jobs of types i and 2m − i, i = 2 . . . m − 1, follow the same practice, given the strategies of jobs of types i − 1, 2m − i + 1. For the jobs of type m, the strategies described in the aforementioned assignment are best possible, given the strategies of all other jobs. Therefore the described PNE is unique, hence P oS → 2 ) has k jobs, each assigned to a distinct machine. This assignment is a PNE and has makespan k+1 2 (1 + ǫ). In the socially optimum assignment we place all jobs of every type on a dedicated machine and achieve makespan 1 + kǫ (type 
Open Problems
The universe of types U is required to be huge (double exponential) in the proof of Theorem 6. This size is non-realistic for most interesting practical settings. Is there a lower size of U that yields P oA ≥ m+1 2 for type ordering mechanisms? E.g., the proof requires that |U| ≥ 9 when m = 2, although |U| ≥ 3 suffices. The performance of type ordering mechanisms is not fully characterized by theorem 6; there may be certain sizes of |U| below which these mechanisms may perform better. Another interesting issue is when type ordering mechanisms are a priori aware of the subset of types T that corresponds to players J . What is the impact of such an a priori knowledge to the achievable P oA by type ordering mechanisms? We have not considered in this paper simply local mechanisms or more challenging machine environments (uniformly related or unrelated machines). All these are interesting aspects for future developments on the subject.
